Hj Holm
Vice Dean Research Education, Professor
The Demand for Information Services and the Market Structure
Author
Summary, in English
Uninformed buyers' demand for statistical screening between privately informed sellers is studied in a fixed price market. A single buyer will screen more extensively than would two or more buyers, since in the latter case buyers realize that sellers will be attracted to buyers with the most favorable screening policy (i.e., not to screen at all). This result is robust to some but not all types of modifications in the model. For instance, information quality differences in the sense of Blackwell will reinforce this effect. Furthermore, in equilibrium only the best information service will be used.
Department/s
- Department of Economics
Publishing year
2002
Language
English
Pages
155-183
Publication/Series
Journal of Economics
Volume
77
Issue
2
Links
Document type
Journal article
Publisher
Springer
Topic
- Economics
Keywords
- screening
- information service
- market behavior
Status
Published
ISBN/ISSN/Other
- ISSN: 1617-7134