Hj Holm
Vice Dean Research Education, Professor
Speech is Silver; Silence is Golden
Author
Summary, in English
This paper experimentally investigates free-riding behavior on communication cost in a coordination game and finds strong indications of such free-riding. Firstly,the subjects wait for others to send a message when communication is costly, which does not happen when communication is costless. Secondly, the proportion of games where no communication or one-way communication takes place is much higher when
communication is costly compared to when it is free.
communication is costly compared to when it is free.
Department/s
- Department of Economics
Publishing year
2013
Language
English
Pages
497-507
Publication/Series
Games
Volume
4
Issue
3
Full text
- Available as PDF - 120 kB
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Document type
Journal article (letter)
Publisher
MDPI AG
Topic
- Economics
Keywords
- free-riding
- communication
- coordination
Status
Published
ISBN/ISSN/Other
- ISSN: 2073-4336