The browser you are using is not supported by this website. All versions of Internet Explorer are no longer supported, either by us or Microsoft (read more here: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/windows/end-of-ie-support).

Please use a modern browser to fully experience our website, such as the newest versions of Edge, Chrome, Firefox or Safari etc.

Porträttfoto

Hj Holm

Vice Dean Research Education, Professor

Porträttfoto

Speech is Silver; Silence is Golden

Author

  • Ola Andersson
  • Jerker Holm

Summary, in English

This paper experimentally investigates free-riding behavior on communication cost in a coordination game and finds strong indications of such free-riding. Firstly,the subjects wait for others to send a message when communication is costly, which does not happen when communication is costless. Secondly, the proportion of games where no communication or one-way communication takes place is much higher when

communication is costly compared to when it is free.

Department/s

  • Department of Economics

Publishing year

2013

Language

English

Pages

497-507

Publication/Series

Games

Volume

4

Issue

3

Document type

Journal article (letter)

Publisher

MDPI AG

Topic

  • Economics

Keywords

  • free-riding
  • communication
  • coordination

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 2073-4336