Erik Wengström
Professor, Director of Doctoral studies, Department of Economics
How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information?
Author
Summary, in English
This paper experimentally studies unilateral communication of intentions in eight different two-player one-shot normal form games with complete information. We find that communication is used both to coordinate and to deceive, and that messages have a significant impact on beliefs and behavior even in dominance solvable games. Nash equilibrium and cognitive hierarchy jointly account for many regularities, but not all of the evidence. Sophisticated sender behavior is especially difficult to reconcile with existing models.
Department/s
- Department of Economics
Publishing year
2018-01-01
Language
English
Pages
153-181
Publication/Series
Games and Economic Behavior
Volume
107
Document type
Journal article
Publisher
0899-8256
Topic
- Economics
Keywords
- Cheap talk
- Noncooperative game theory
- Pre-play communication
Status
Published
ISBN/ISSN/Other
- ISSN: 0899-8256