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Portrait of Tommy Andersson. Photo.

Tommy Andersson

Professor

Portrait of Tommy Andersson. Photo.

Strategy-Proof Allocation of Objects Revisited

Author

  • Tommy Andersson
  • Lars-Gunnar Svensson

Summary, in English

We consider an allocation problem with a finite number of objects, and agents that demand at most one of the objects. The study provides a characterization of a class of strategy-proof price mechanisms. A mechanism belongs to the class if and only if the price space is restricted in a special way and, given that restriction, the outcome prices are minimal. The domain of the mechanisms is the set of general preference profiles (R_1,R_2,…,R_n), i.e., where R_a is agent a's rational, monotonic and continuous preference ordering over objects and prices.

Department/s

  • Department of Economics

Publishing year

2018

Language

English

Pages

14-14

Publication/Series

Working Papers

Issue

2018:21

Document type

Working paper

Topic

  • Economics

Keywords

  • Characterization
  • House-allocation
  • Strategy-proofness
  • Multiobject auction
  • D44
  • D47
  • D63
  • D78
  • D82

Status

Published