Tommy Andersson
Professor
Strategy-Proof Allocation of Objects Revisited
Author
Summary, in English
We consider an allocation problem with a finite number of objects, and agents that demand at most one of the objects. The study provides a characterization of a class of strategy-proof price mechanisms. A mechanism belongs to the class if and only if the price space is restricted in a special way and, given that restriction, the outcome prices are minimal. The domain of the mechanisms is the set of general preference profiles (R_1,R_2,…,R_n), i.e., where R_a is agent a's rational, monotonic and continuous preference ordering over objects and prices.
Department/s
- Department of Economics
Publishing year
2018
Language
English
Pages
14-14
Publication/Series
Working Papers
Issue
2018:21
Links
Document type
Working paper
Topic
- Economics
Keywords
- Characterization
- House-allocation
- Strategy-proofness
- Multiobject auction
- D44
- D47
- D63
- D78
- D82
Status
Published