Tommy Andersson
Professor
An Algorithm for Identifying Least Manipulable Envy-Free and Budget-Balanced Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities
Author
Summary, in English
We analyze the problem of allocating indivisible objects and monetary compensations to a set of agents. In particular, we consider envy-free and budget-balanced rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. A key observation is that, for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via so-called agent-k-linked allocations. Given this observation, we provide an algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations.
Department/s
- Department of Economics
Publishing year
2021
Language
English
Publication/Series
Working Papers
Issue
2021:2
Full text
- Available as PDF - 271 kB
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Document type
Working paper
Topic
- Economics
Keywords
- Envy-freeness
- Budget-balance
- Least manipulable
- Algorithm
- C71
- C78
- D63
- D71
- D78
Status
Published