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Portrait of Tommy Andersson. Photo.

Tommy Andersson

Professor

Portrait of Tommy Andersson. Photo.

An Algorithm for Identifying Least Manipulable Envy-Free and Budget-Balanced Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities

Author

  • Tommy Andersson
  • Lars Ehlers

Summary, in English

We analyze the problem of allocating indivisible objects and monetary compensations to a set of agents. In particular, we consider envy-free and budget-balanced rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. A key observation is that, for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via so-called agent-k-linked allocations. Given this observation, we provide an algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations.

Department/s

  • Department of Economics

Publishing year

2021

Language

English

Publication/Series

Working Papers

Issue

2021:2

Document type

Working paper

Topic

  • Economics

Keywords

  • Envy-freeness
  • Budget-balance
  • Least manipulable
  • Algorithm
  • C71
  • C78
  • D63
  • D71
  • D78

Status

Published