Tommy Andersson
Professor
Strategy-proof allocation of objects : A characterization result
Author
Summary, in English
This paper considers an allocation problem with a finite number of objects and unit-demand agents. The main result is a characterization of a class of strategy-proof price mechanisms on a general domain where preferences over pairs of objects and houses are rational, monotonic, and continuous. A mechanism belongs to this class if and only if the price space is restricted in a special way and, given this restriction, that the mechanism selects minimal equilibrium prices.
Department/s
- Department of Economics
Publishing year
2024-03
Language
English
Pages
1-5
Publication/Series
Mathematical Social Sciences
Volume
128
Links
Document type
Journal article
Publisher
Elsevier
Topic
- Economics
Keywords
- Characterization
- House allocation
- Multi-object auction
- Strategy-proofness
Status
Published
ISBN/ISSN/Other
- ISSN: 0165-4896