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Portrait of Tommy Andersson. Photo.

Tommy Andersson

Professor

Portrait of Tommy Andersson. Photo.

Strategy-proof allocation of objects : A characterization result

Author

  • Tommy Andersson
  • Lars Gunnar Svensson

Summary, in English

This paper considers an allocation problem with a finite number of objects and unit-demand agents. The main result is a characterization of a class of strategy-proof price mechanisms on a general domain where preferences over pairs of objects and houses are rational, monotonic, and continuous. A mechanism belongs to this class if and only if the price space is restricted in a special way and, given this restriction, that the mechanism selects minimal equilibrium prices.

Department/s

  • Department of Economics

Publishing year

2024-03

Language

English

Pages

1-5

Publication/Series

Mathematical Social Sciences

Volume

128

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Elsevier

Topic

  • Economics

Keywords

  • Characterization
  • House allocation
  • Multi-object auction
  • Strategy-proofness

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 0165-4896