Tommy Andersson
Professor
Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Efficient Stable Maximum Matchings
Author
Summary, in English
In this paper, we investigate the problem of finding housing for refugees once they have been granted asylum. In particular, we demonstrate that market design can play an important role in a partial solution to the problem. More specifically, we investigate a specific matching system, and we propose an easy‐to‐implement mechanism that finds an efficient, stable, and maximum matching. Such a matching guarantees that housing is efficiently provided to a maximum number of refugees, and that no refugee prefers another specific landlord to their current match when, at the same time, that specific landlord prefers that refugee to their own current match.
Department/s
- Department of Economics
Publishing year
2020-07
Language
English
Pages
937-965
Publication/Series
Scandinavian Journal of Economics
Volume
122
Issue
3
Document type
Journal article
Publisher
Wiley-Blackwell
Topic
- International Migration and Ethnic Relations
Status
Published
ISBN/ISSN/Other
- ISSN: 1467-9442