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Portrait of Tommy Andersson. Photo.

Tommy Andersson

Professor

Portrait of Tommy Andersson. Photo.

Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden: Efficient Stable Maximum Matchings

Author

  • Tommy Andersson
  • Lars Ehlers

Summary, in English

In this paper, we investigate the problem of finding housing for refugees once they have been granted asylum. In particular, we demonstrate that market design can play an important role in a partial solution to the problem. More specifically, we investigate a specific matching system, and we propose an easy‐to‐implement mechanism that finds an efficient, stable, and maximum matching. Such a matching guarantees that housing is efficiently provided to a maximum number of refugees, and that no refugee prefers another specific landlord to their current match when, at the same time, that specific landlord prefers that refugee to their own current match.

Department/s

  • Department of Economics

Publishing year

2020-07

Language

English

Pages

937-965

Publication/Series

Scandinavian Journal of Economics

Volume

122

Issue

3

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Wiley-Blackwell

Topic

  • International Migration and Ethnic Relations

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 1467-9442