Tommy Andersson
Professor
Sequential Rules for House Allocation with Price Restrictions
Author
Summary, in English
This paper considers a housing market with price restrictions. On such market, price equilibrium may be excluded for certain preference profiles. However, the existence of a unique minimal rationing price equilibrium has previously been established on a general preference domain that contains “almost all” preference profiles. This type of equilibrium has been demonstrated to be an important ingredient in a direct and strategy-proof allocation mechanism for housing markets with price restrictions. The main contribution of this paper is to provide a finite ascending price sequence that terminates to a minimal rationing price equilibrium. This sequence is demonstrated to play a key-role in an Iterative English Auction Rule for housing markets with price restrictions.
Department/s
- Department of Economics
Publishing year
2018
Language
English
Pages
41-59
Publication/Series
Games and Economic Behavior
Volume
107
Document type
Journal article
Publisher
0899-8256
Topic
- Economics
Keywords
- rationing price equilibrium
- (extended) english price sequences
- iterative English auction rule
- C78
- D44
- D45
Status
Published
ISBN/ISSN/Other
- ISSN: 0899-8256