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Portrait of Tommy Andersson. Photo.

Tommy Andersson

Professor

Portrait of Tommy Andersson. Photo.

Sequential Rules for House Allocation with Price Restrictions

Author

  • Tommy Andersson
  • Lars-Gunnar Svensson

Summary, in English

This paper considers a housing market with price restrictions. On such market, price equilibrium may be excluded for certain preference profiles. However, the existence of a unique minimal rationing price equilibrium has previously been established on a general preference domain that contains “almost all” preference profiles. This type of equilibrium has been demonstrated to be an important ingredient in a direct and strategy-proof allocation mechanism for housing markets with price restrictions. The main contribution of this paper is to provide a finite ascending price sequence that terminates to a minimal rationing price equilibrium. This sequence is demonstrated to play a key-role in an Iterative English Auction Rule for housing markets with price restrictions.

Department/s

  • Department of Economics

Publishing year

2018

Language

English

Pages

41-59

Publication/Series

Games and Economic Behavior

Volume

107

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

0899-8256

Topic

  • Economics

Keywords

  • rationing price equilibrium
  • (extended) english price sequences
  • iterative English auction rule
  • C78
  • D44
  • D45

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 0899-8256