Tommy Andersson
Professor
An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy-free and budget-balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities
Author
Summary, in English
We analyze the problem of allocating indivisible objects and monetary compensations to a set of agents. In particular, we consider envy-free and budget-balanced rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. A key observation is that, for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via so-called agent- (Formula presented.) -linked allocations. Given this observation, we provide an algorithm for identifying agent- (Formula presented.) -linked allocations.
Department/s
- Department of Economics
Publishing year
2022
Language
English
Pages
50-60
Publication/Series
International Journal of Economic Theory
Volume
18
Issue
1
Document type
Journal article
Publisher
Wiley-Blackwell
Topic
- Economics
Keywords
- algorithm
- budget-balance
- envy-freeness
- least manipulable
Status
Published
ISBN/ISSN/Other
- ISSN: 1742-7355