The browser you are using is not supported by this website. All versions of Internet Explorer are no longer supported, either by us or Microsoft (read more here: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/windows/end-of-ie-support).

Please use a modern browser to fully experience our website, such as the newest versions of Edge, Chrome, Firefox or Safari etc.

Portrait of Tommy Andersson. Photo.

Tommy Andersson

Professor

Portrait of Tommy Andersson. Photo.

An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy-free and budget-balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities

Author

  • Tommy Andersson
  • Lars Ehlers

Summary, in English

We analyze the problem of allocating indivisible objects and monetary compensations to a set of agents. In particular, we consider envy-free and budget-balanced rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. A key observation is that, for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via so-called agent- (Formula presented.) -linked allocations. Given this observation, we provide an algorithm for identifying agent- (Formula presented.) -linked allocations.

Department/s

  • Department of Economics

Publishing year

2022

Language

English

Pages

50-60

Publication/Series

International Journal of Economic Theory

Volume

18

Issue

1

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Wiley-Blackwell

Topic

  • Economics

Keywords

  • algorithm
  • budget-balance
  • envy-freeness
  • least manipulable

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 1742-7355