Tommy Andersson
Professor
Strategy-Proof Allocation of Objects: A Characterization Result
Author
Summary, in English
This paper considers an allocation problem with a finite number of objects and unit-demand agents. The main result is a characterization of a class of strategy-proof price mechanisms on a general domain where preferences over pairs of objects and houses are rational, monotonic, and continuous. A mechanism belongs to this class if and only if the price space is restricted in a special way and, given this restriction, that the mechanism selects minimal equilibrium prices.
Department/s
- Department of Economics
Publishing year
2023-10-31
Language
English
Publication/Series
Working Papers
Issue
2023:11
Links
Document type
Working paper
Topic
- Economics
Keywords
- Characterization
- House allocation
- Strategy-proofness
- Multi-object auction
- D44
- D47
- D63
- D78
- D82
Status
Published