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Portrait of Tommy Andersson. Photo.

Tommy Andersson

Professor

Portrait of Tommy Andersson. Photo.

Non-manipulable assignment of individuals to positions revisited

Author

  • Tommy Andersson
  • Lars-Gunnar Svensson

Summary, in English

This paper investigates an allocation rule that fairly assigns at most one indivisible object and a monetary compensation to each agent, Under the restriction that the monetary compensations do not exceed some exogenously given upper bound. A few properties of this allocation rule are stated and the main result demonstrates that the allocation rule is coalitionally strategy-proof. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Department/s

  • Department of Economics

Publishing year

2008

Language

English

Pages

350-354

Publication/Series

Mathematical Social Sciences

Volume

56

Issue

3

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Elsevier

Topic

  • Economics

Keywords

  • Coalitionally strategy-proofness
  • Fairness
  • Indivisibles

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 0165-4896