Tommy Andersson
Professor
Multiple Pricing for Health Care Services
Author
Summary, in English
This paper provides a theoretical model that captures the essential features of a Swedish health care reform where private and public health care providers serve patients with certain functional impairments, but where only private providers can reject service requests from patients. Since the hourly price compensation is fixed, this type of systems is expected to result in a monetary deficit for public providers (since they can not reject proposals from “unprofitable” patients). This paper proposes a more advanced pricing system and characterizes its optimal solution. A numerical analysis demonstrates that the deficit for the public provider can be substantially reduced without affecting the total budget.
Department/s
- Department of Economics
Publishing year
2021
Language
English
Publication/Series
Working Papers
Issue
2021:14
Links
Document type
Working paper
Topic
- Economics
Keywords
- health care services
- public and private providers
- multiple pricing
- welfare
- C61
- D47
- D78
- I11
Status
Published