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Portrait of Tommy Andersson. Photo.

Tommy Andersson

Professor

Portrait of Tommy Andersson. Photo.

Sequential Rules for House Allocation with Price Restrictions

Author

  • Tommy Andersson
  • Lars-Gunnar Svensson

Summary, in English

This paper considers a housing market with price restrictions. On such markets, the existence of a unique minimum rationing equilibrium price vector has been established for each preference profile on a general preference domain that contains almost all preference profiles. This vector can be used as a key ingredient in a direct and strategy-proof allocation mechanism. The main contribution of this paper is to provide two price sequences, one with increasing prices and one with decreasing prices, that both terminate to a minimal rationing equilibrium price vector in a finite number of steps. These sequences are demonstrated to play key-roles in an English auction and a Dutch auction, respectively, for the considered housing market with price restrictions.

Department/s

  • Department of Economics

Publishing year

2015

Language

English

Publication/Series

Working Paper / Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University

Issue

18

Document type

Working paper

Publisher

Department of Economics, Lund University

Topic

  • Economics

Keywords

  • Price sequence
  • auction rules
  • rationing
  • rationing equilibrium price

Status

Published