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Portrait of Tommy Andersson. Photo.

Tommy Andersson

Professor

Portrait of Tommy Andersson. Photo.

Dynamic Refugee Matching

Author

  • Tommy Andersson
  • Lars Ehlers
  • Alessandro Martinello

Summary, in English

Asylum seekers are often assigned to a locality in their host country directly upon arrival based on some type of uninformed dynamic matching system which does not take the background of the asylum seekers into consideration. This paper proposes an informed, intuitive, easy-to-implement and computationally efficient dynamic mechanism for matching asylum seekers to localities. This mechanism can be adopted in any dynamic refugee matching problem given locality-specific quotas and that asylum seekers can be classified into specific types. We demonstrate that any matching selected by the proposed mechanism is Pareto efficient and that envy between localities is bounded by a single asylum seeker. Via simulation, we evaluate the performance of the proposed mechanism in settings that resemble the US and the Swedish situations, and show that our mechanism outperforms uninformed mechanisms even in presence of severe misclassification error in the estimation of asylum seeker types.

Department/s

  • Department of Economics

Publishing year

2018

Language

English

Publication/Series

Working Papers

Issue

2018:7

Document type

Working paper

Topic

  • Economics

Keywords

  • forced migration
  • market design
  • refugee matching
  • dynamics
  • envy
  • efficiency
  • C71
  • C78
  • D71
  • D78
  • F22

Status

Published