Tommy Andersson
Professor
Organizing Time Exchanges: Lessons from Matching Markets
Author
Summary, in English
This paper considers time exchanges via a common platform (e.g., markets for exchanging time units, positions at education institutions, and tuition waivers). There are several problems associated with such markets, e.g., imbalanced outcomes, coordination problems, and inefficiencies. We model time exchanges as matching markets and construct a non-manipulable mechanism that selects an individually rational and balanced allocation which maximizes exchanges among the participating agents (and those allocations are efficient). This mechanism works on a preference domain whereby agents classify the goods provided by other participating agents as either unacceptable or acceptable, and for goods classified as acceptable agents have specific upper quotas representing their maximum needs.
Department/s
- Department of Economics
Publishing year
2021
Language
English
Pages
338-373
Publication/Series
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Volume
13
Issue
1
Full text
- Available as PDF - 509 kB
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Document type
Journal article
Publisher
American Economic Association
Topic
- Economics
Keywords
- market design
- time banking
- priority mechanism
- non-manipulability
Status
Published
ISBN/ISSN/Other
- ISSN: 1945-7669