The browser you are using is not supported by this website. All versions of Internet Explorer are no longer supported, either by us or Microsoft (read more here: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/windows/end-of-ie-support).

Please use a modern browser to fully experience our website, such as the newest versions of Edge, Chrome, Firefox or Safari etc.

Portrait of Tommy Andersson. Photo.

Tommy Andersson

Professor

Portrait of Tommy Andersson. Photo.

Organizing Time Exchanges: Lessons from Matching Markets

Author

  • Tommy Andersson
  • Ágnes Csehz
  • Lars Ehlers
  • Albin Erlanson

Summary, in English

This paper considers time exchanges via a common platform (e.g., markets for exchanging time units, positions at education institutions, and tuition waivers). There are several problems associated with such markets, e.g., imbalanced outcomes, coordination problems, and inefficiencies. We model time exchanges as matching markets and construct a non-manipulable mechanism that selects an individually rational and balanced allocation which maximizes exchanges among the participating agents (and those allocations are efficient). This mechanism works on a preference domain whereby agents classify the goods provided by other participating agents as either unacceptable or acceptable, and for goods classified as acceptable agents have specific upper quotas representing their maximum needs.

Department/s

  • Department of Economics

Publishing year

2021

Language

English

Pages

338-373

Publication/Series

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

Volume

13

Issue

1

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

American Economic Association

Topic

  • Economics

Keywords

  • market design
  • time banking
  • priority mechanism
  • non-manipulability

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 1945-7669