Fredrik N G Andersson
Associate professor
Hur bör vi reglera självständiga centralbanker? Riksbanken och den penningpolitiska verktygslådan.
Author
Summary, in Swedish
How should we regulate independent central banks? The Riksbank and its
monetary policy toolkit .Within what boundaries are independent central banks allowed to operate? This question is seldom discussed but has gained prominence due to the changes in monetary policy since the 2008/09 financial crisis. Notably, the Swedish central bank, the Riksbank, along with other central banks, has expanded its monetary policy toolkit to include so-called quantitative easing—primarily the purchase of securities, mainly bonds. Originally conceived as crisis instruments, these balance sheet measures have increasingly been embraced as monetary policy tools for stabilizing both the economic cycle and inflation. A growing body of literature suggests that these measures carry numerous adverse side-effects on the macroeconomy, and risk extending monetary policy beyond the original constraints set when the Riksbank gained independence in the 1990s. This article problematizes this evolution and raises the question of whether the monetary policy framework needs to be updated to limit the discretionary space of an independent Riksbank. The article concludes with a discussion on what potential reforms to this framework might entail.
monetary policy toolkit .Within what boundaries are independent central banks allowed to operate? This question is seldom discussed but has gained prominence due to the changes in monetary policy since the 2008/09 financial crisis. Notably, the Swedish central bank, the Riksbank, along with other central banks, has expanded its monetary policy toolkit to include so-called quantitative easing—primarily the purchase of securities, mainly bonds. Originally conceived as crisis instruments, these balance sheet measures have increasingly been embraced as monetary policy tools for stabilizing both the economic cycle and inflation. A growing body of literature suggests that these measures carry numerous adverse side-effects on the macroeconomy, and risk extending monetary policy beyond the original constraints set when the Riksbank gained independence in the 1990s. This article problematizes this evolution and raises the question of whether the monetary policy framework needs to be updated to limit the discretionary space of an independent Riksbank. The article concludes with a discussion on what potential reforms to this framework might entail.
Department/s
- Department of Economics
- LU Profile Area: Nature-based future solutions
Publishing year
2024-03-27
Language
Swedish
Pages
27-52
Publication/Series
Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift
Volume
126
Issue
1
Document type
Journal article
Publisher
Fahlbeckska stiftelsen
Topic
- Economics and Business
- Economics
Keywords
- penningpolitik
- riksbank
- centralbank
- balansräkningsåtgärder
- styrränta
- kvantitativa lättnader
- quantitative easing
- finansiell stabilitet
- inflation
Status
Published
ISBN/ISSN/Other
- ISSN: 0039-0747