Fredrik Andersson
Professor, Head of the Department of Economics
Outsourcing Public Services: Contractibility, Cost, and Quality
Author
Summary, in English
We review the literature on public sector outsourcing to explore if the theoretical predictions from the incomplete contracts literature hold up to recent empirical evidence. Guided by theory, we arrange services according to the type and magnitude of their contractibility problems. The empirical studies point at rather favourable outsourcing outcomes, in terms of costs and quality, for services without severe contracting problems. The picture is more mixed for services with tougher contracting problems, with the weight of the evidence in favour of public provision. This difference between services is largely in line with the property-rights framework and theories of incomplete contracts.
Department/s
- Department of Economics
Publishing year
2019-12
Language
English
Pages
349-372
Publication/Series
CESifo Economic Studies
Volume
65
Issue
4
Document type
Journal article review
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Topic
- Public Administration Studies
Keywords
- Contracts
- Public services
Status
Published
ISBN/ISSN/Other
- ISSN: 1610-241X