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Portrait of Fredrik Andersson. Photo.

Fredrik Andersson

Professor, Head of the Department of Economics

Portrait of Fredrik Andersson. Photo.

Outsourcing Public Services: Contractibility, Cost, and Quality

Author

  • Fredrik Andersson
  • Henrik Jordahl
  • Jens Josephson

Summary, in English

We review the literature on public sector outsourcing to explore if the theoretical predictions from the incomplete contracts literature hold up to recent empirical evidence. Guided by theory, we arrange services according to the type and magnitude of their contractibility problems. The empirical studies point at rather favourable outsourcing outcomes, in terms of costs and quality, for services without severe contracting problems. The picture is more mixed for services with tougher contracting problems, with the weight of the evidence in favour of public provision. This difference between services is largely in line with the property-rights framework and theories of incomplete contracts.

Department/s

  • Department of Economics

Publishing year

2019-12

Language

English

Pages

349-372

Publication/Series

CESifo Economic Studies

Volume

65

Issue

4

Document type

Journal article review

Publisher

Oxford University Press

Topic

  • Public Administration Studies

Keywords

  • Contracts
  • Public services

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 1610-241X