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Portrait of Erik Wengström. Photo.

Erik Wengström

Professor, Director of Doctoral studies, Department of Economics

Portrait of Erik Wengström. Photo.

Price competition, level-k theory and communication

Author

  • Erik Wengström

Summary, in English

This paper analyzes communication in a price competition game using the level-$k$ theory of bounded rationality. The level-k analysis predicts prices to be higher with communication than without. Our experimental evidence lends support to the view that communication affects subjects in a way that is compatible with the level-k model, indicating that people lie in order to fool other players that they believe do less thinking. Moreover, the results indicate that the predictive power of the level-k model does crucially depend on the possibility for high level players to form homogenous beliefs about the behavior of the level-0 players

Publishing year

2008

Language

English

Pages

1-15

Publication/Series

Economics Bulletin

Volume

3

Issue

66

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Economics Bulletin

Topic

  • Economics

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 1545-2921