Erik Wengström
Professor, Director of Doctoral studies, Department of Economics
Risk and Cooperation : Experimental Evidence from Stochastic Public Good Games
Author
Summary, in English
Outcomes in social dilemmas often have a stochastic component. We report experimental findings from public good games with both correlated and independent risk across players. We find that the presence of both types of risk prevents the decay of cooperation typically observed in the standard deterministic public good game. The results further suggest that it is greater relative importance of social norms or warm glow giving, rather than risk sharing opportunities that foster cooperation in our stochastic public good game.
Department/s
- Department of Economics
Publishing year
2017-03-02
Language
English
Publication/Series
Working Papers
Volume
2017
Issue
3
Full text
Document type
Working paper
Publisher
Department of Economics, Lund University
Topic
- Economics
Keywords
- risk pooling
- risk sharing
- social norms
- linear public goods game
- cooperation decay
- stable cooperation
- H41
- D03
- D80
Status
Published