The browser you are using is not supported by this website. All versions of Internet Explorer are no longer supported, either by us or Microsoft (read more here: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/windows/end-of-ie-support).

Please use a modern browser to fully experience our website, such as the newest versions of Edge, Chrome, Firefox or Safari etc.

Portrait of Erik Wengström. Photo.

Erik Wengström

Professor, Director of Doctoral studies, Department of Economics

Portrait of Erik Wengström. Photo.

Risk and Cooperation : Experimental Evidence from Stochastic Public Good Games

Author

  • Erik Wengström
  • Stepan Vesely

Summary, in English

Outcomes in social dilemmas often have a stochastic component. We report experimental findings from public good games with both correlated and independent risk across players. We find that the presence of both types of risk prevents the decay of cooperation typically observed in the standard deterministic public good game. The results further suggest that it is greater relative importance of social norms or warm glow giving, rather than risk sharing opportunities that foster cooperation in our stochastic public good game.

Department/s

  • Department of Economics

Publishing year

2017-03-02

Language

English

Publication/Series

Working Papers

Volume

2017

Issue

3

Document type

Working paper

Publisher

Department of Economics, Lund University

Topic

  • Economics

Keywords

  • risk pooling
  • risk sharing
  • social norms
  • linear public goods game
  • cooperation decay
  • stable cooperation
  • H41
  • D03
  • D80

Status

Published