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Portrait of Erik Wengström. Photo.

Erik Wengström

Professor, Director of Doctoral studies, Department of Economics

Portrait of Erik Wengström. Photo.

How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information?

Author

  • Tore Ellingsen
  • Robert Östling
  • Erik Wengström

Summary, in English

This paper experimentally studies unilateral communication of intentions in eight different two-player one-shot normal form games with complete information. We find that communication is used both to coordinate and to deceive, and that messages have a significant impact on beliefs and behavior even in dominance solvable games. Nash equilibrium and cognitive hierarchy jointly account for many regularities, but not all of the evidence. Sophisticated sender behavior is especially difficult to reconcile with existing models.

Department/s

  • Department of Economics

Publishing year

2018-01-01

Language

English

Pages

153-181

Publication/Series

Games and Economic Behavior

Volume

107

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

0899-8256

Topic

  • Economics

Keywords

  • Cheap talk
  • Noncooperative game theory
  • Pre-play communication

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 0899-8256