The browser you are using is not supported by this website. All versions of Internet Explorer are no longer supported, either by us or Microsoft (read more here: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/windows/end-of-ie-support).

Please use a modern browser to fully experience our website, such as the newest versions of Edge, Chrome, Firefox or Safari etc.

Portrait of Erik Wengström. Photo.

Erik Wengström

Professor, Director of Doctoral studies, Department of Economics

Portrait of Erik Wengström. Photo.

A note on renegotiation in repeated Bertrand duopolies

Author

  • Ola Andersson
  • Erik Wengström

Summary, in English

Weak Renegotiation-Proofness (WW) singles out marginal cost pricing as a unique pure-strategy equilibrium of the infinitely repeated Bertrand duopoly. We show that, with a discrete strategy space, WRP does not eliminate any relevant subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Department/s

  • Department of Economics

Publishing year

2007

Language

English

Pages

398-401

Publication/Series

Economics Letters

Volume

95

Issue

3

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Elsevier

Topic

  • Economics

Keywords

  • repeated
  • noncooperative game theory
  • weak renegotiation-proofness
  • bertrand games

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 0165-1765