Tommy Andersson
Professor
Unlocking Legal Efficiency Gains in School Switch Programs
Author
Summary, in English
We study school switches in which students who have already been assigned seats request
reassignment. Unlike in regular school choice, stability need not be legally binding in such
programs, since students’ priority-based claims have already been satisfied upstream. Effi-
ciency then naturally becomes the primary design objective. To quantify the potential legal
efficiency gains, we compare Deferred Acceptance (DA) with Top Trading Cycles (TTC) and
an efficiency-adjusted DA (EADAM) using Swedish data. TTC and EADAM triple switch-
ing rates compared to DA. This difference is driven by the absence of slack in effective
capacity and shrinks rapidly when introducing additional seats.
reassignment. Unlike in regular school choice, stability need not be legally binding in such
programs, since students’ priority-based claims have already been satisfied upstream. Effi-
ciency then naturally becomes the primary design objective. To quantify the potential legal
efficiency gains, we compare Deferred Acceptance (DA) with Top Trading Cycles (TTC) and
an efficiency-adjusted DA (EADAM) using Swedish data. TTC and EADAM triple switch-
ing rates compared to DA. This difference is driven by the absence of slack in effective
capacity and shrinks rapidly when introducing additional seats.
Department/s
- Department of Economics
Publishing year
2026
Language
English
Publication/Series
Working Papers
Issue
2026:4
Full text
- Available as PDF - 634 kB
Document type
Working paper
Topic
- Economics
Keywords
- School switch
- Efficiency
- Stability
- Matching algorithms
- Capacity slack.
- C78
- D47
- D78
Status
Published