The browser you are using is not supported by this website. All versions of Internet Explorer are no longer supported, either by us or Microsoft (read more here: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/windows/end-of-ie-support).

Please use a modern browser to fully experience our website, such as the newest versions of Edge, Chrome, Firefox or Safari etc.

Portrait of Tommy Andersson. Photo.

Tommy Andersson

Professor

Portrait of Tommy Andersson. Photo.

Unlocking Legal Efficiency Gains in School Switch Programs

Author

  • Tommy Andersson
  • Nils Lager
  • Dany Kessel

Summary, in English

We study school switches in which students who have already been assigned seats request
reassignment. Unlike in regular school choice, stability need not be legally binding in such
programs, since students’ priority-based claims have already been satisfied upstream. Effi-
ciency then naturally becomes the primary design objective. To quantify the potential legal
efficiency gains, we compare Deferred Acceptance (DA) with Top Trading Cycles (TTC) and
an efficiency-adjusted DA (EADAM) using Swedish data. TTC and EADAM triple switch-
ing rates compared to DA. This difference is driven by the absence of slack in effective
capacity and shrinks rapidly when introducing additional seats.

Department/s

  • Department of Economics

Publishing year

2026

Language

English

Publication/Series

Working Papers

Issue

2026:4

Full text

Document type

Working paper

Topic

  • Economics

Keywords

  • School switch
  • Efficiency
  • Stability
  • Matching algorithms
  • Capacity slack.
  • C78
  • D47
  • D78

Status

Published