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Roel van Veldhuizen . Photo

Roel van Veldhuizen

Senior lecturer

Roel van Veldhuizen . Photo

Bribery: Behavioral Drivers of Distorted Decisions

Author

  • Uri Gneezy
  • Silvia Saccardo
  • Roel van Veldhuizen

Summary, in English

We experimentally investigate behavioral drivers of bribery, focusing on the role of self-interest, reciprocity, and moral costs associated with distorting judgment. In our laboratory experiment, two participants compete for a prize; a referee picks the winner. Participants can bribe the referee. When the referee can keep only the winner's bribe, bribes distort her judgment. When the referee keeps the bribes regardless of the winner, bribes no longer influence her decision. An experiment in an Indian market confirms these results. These findings imply that our participants are influenced by bribes out of self-interest, and not because of a desire to reciprocate. Further evidence shows that self-interest guides decisions to a greater extent when referees have scope for avoiding the moral costs associated with distorting judgment. As a result, limiting referees’ ability to form self-serving evaluations can significantly reduce the effectiveness of bribes.

Department/s

  • Department of Economics

Publishing year

2019-06

Language

English

Pages

917-946

Publication/Series

Journal of the European Economic Association

Volume

17

Issue

3

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Wiley-Blackwell

Topic

  • Economics

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 1542-4774