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Portrait of Erik Wengström. Photo.

Erik Wengström

Director of Doctoral studies, Department of Economics, Professor

Portrait of Erik Wengström. Photo.

Performance Incentives in Education: The Role of Goal Mismatch

Author

  • Pol Campos-Mercade
  • Petra Thiemann
  • Erik Wengström

Summary, in English

We conduct a field experiment studying how financial incentives for achieving specific course grades affect university students, whether effects vary by ability, and whether allowing students to choose their goals improves outcomes. We find that incentives negatively affect performance, particularly among low-ability students assigned high goals. Survey data suggest this negative impact arises from a mismatch between assigned goals and students’ abilities, distorting their reference points and expectations. Allowing students to choose their goals partially mitigates this effect but does not eliminate it. Our results caution against incentives in education and highlight a novel mechanism through which incentives can backfire.

Department/s

  • Department of Economics
  • Centre for Economic Demography
  • LU Profile Area: Natural and Artificial Cognition
  • Centre for Retail Research at Lund University

Publishing year

2025-05-07

Language

English

Publication/Series

Working Papers

Issue

2025:5

Document type

Working paper

Topic

  • Economics

Keywords

  • Incentives
  • Performance goals
  • Academic performance
  • Field experiment
  • C93
  • D90
  • I22
  • I23

Status

Published