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Portrait of Erik Wengström. Photo.

Erik Wengström

Director of Doctoral studies, Department of Economics, Professor

Portrait of Erik Wengström. Photo.

Increased cooperation in stochastic social dilemmas : Can it be explained by risk sharing?

Author

  • Stepan Vesely
  • Erik Wengström

Summary, in English

A potential mechanism to explain changes in cooperativeness in the presence of risk may be opportunities for informal risk sharing. Using a novel experimental design, we show that the presence of both independent and correlated risk prevents the typical decay of cooperation in a laboratory social dilemma game. Notably, this result seems to rule out risk sharing as a possible mechanism behind the cooperation increase. Exploratory analyses tentatively suggest that behavior consistent with a risk sharing account may emerge late in the game, congruent with previous theorizing of slow learning in stochastic environments.

Department/s

  • Department of Economics

Publishing year

2025-02

Language

English

Publication/Series

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics

Volume

114

Document type

Journal article

Publisher

Elsevier

Topic

  • Economics

Keywords

  • Cooperation under risk
  • Public good game
  • Risk sharing

Status

Published

ISBN/ISSN/Other

  • ISSN: 2214-8043